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klternative Tax Rules and Personal Savings incentives:
MicroeconomicData and Behavioral Siriulat ions
SUWIARY
This study examines the potential effects on personal savings of
alternativetypes of tax rules. The analysis makes use of two extensive samples
of information on individual savings and financial income: the 1972 Consumer
Expenditure Survey and a stratified random sample of 26,000 individual tax
returns for that year.
The first type of tax rule that we consider would permit all tax-
payers to make tax deductible contributions to individual savings accounts.
The interest and dividends earned in these accounts would also accumulate
untaxed. A potential problem with any such plan is that Individuals could in
principle obtain tax deductions without doing any additional saving merely by
transferring pre—existing assets into the special accounts. The evidence that
we have examined indicates that this Is not likely to be important in practice
since most taxpayers currently have little or no financial assets with which to
make such transfers. For example, a plan permitting contributions of 10 percent
of wages up to $2000 a year would exhaust all the pre—existing assets of 75 per-
cent of households in just 2 years. Our evidence also shows that a ceiling on
annual contributions of 10 percent of wages still leaves an increased saving
incentive for more than 80 percent of households since fewer than 20 percent of
householdscurrently save asmuchas 10 percent ayear. Specific simulations of
avariety ofsuch proposals show that even whenincomeand substitution effects
balancefor a representative taxpayer (implying nochange inhis consumption)
aggregatesaving would rise considerably.
The second type of tax rule that we examine would increase the current
$200 interest and dividend exclusion. In 1972, among families with incomes of
$20,000 to $30,000, 55 percent had more than $200 of interest and dividends; for
thosewith incomes of at least $30,000, 82 percent had more than $200 of
interestand dividends. For such families, the$200exclusion provides no
incentivefor additional saving. Our analysisconsiders four ways of
strengthening the saving incentive while limiting the reduction in tax revenue:
(1) a limit of $1000 on the interest and dividend exclusion; (2) a 51) percent
exclusion of interest and dividends up to a $1000 limit; (3) exclusion of
interest and dividends in excess of 5 percent of income over$10,000with an
exclusion limit of $1000;and (4)exclusion of 20 percent of interest and divi-
dend income without anylimit. The revenue effects of all ofthese opt ions were
foundto be quite smalL. Buteven with quite modest elastici tiesof current
consumerspending with respect to the relative oris of present and future con-
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Personalsaving has traditionally accounted for more than half of
all real net private saving in the United States. Incentives that increase the
personal saving rate therefore have a potentially significant effect on the
total rate of capital formation.' The purpose of the current paper is to pre-
sent some new Tricroeconomic evidence that is relevant to evaluating alternative
changes in the personal tax treatment of savings and of interest and dividends.
There has nevertheless long been resistance among both economists and
government officials to changing the tax rules to encouragesaving. 2The oppo-
sition to encouraging savirid has in art been a vesti.e of the Keynesian fear
that a higher rate of savin might only increase unempioyient. Thatever' the
relevance of this concern in earlier decades, oversavind is no lonLer reardel
as a potential problem. A further source of opposition to modifying the tax
rules to encourage saving has been a concern that any such change would thwart
the egalitarian thrust, or ax policy. This in turn reflected a helief that the
There are, of course, many factors in addition to the personal tax
rules that contribute to the low rate of' saving in the United States, including
consumer credit rules, the Social Security system, the taxation of 'business
income,and the tax treatment of personal interest expenses. Ourfocuson the
personaltax treatment of savings and the income from savings should not be
misinterpreted as an indication that we believe that personal tax rules alone
are responsible for the low U.S. saving rates. We do believe, however, that
changes in these tax rules are a potentially useful way of increasing savings.—2—
incentive effects of tax changes would be negligible, implying that tax policy
could only encourage saving by redistributing disposable income from lower
incometaxpayers with low marginal propensities to save to higher income tax-
payers with high marginal propensities to save.
In contrast, there is now strong professional and political interest
intax changes that could encourage personal saving.3 This reflects in part a
reassessment of the earlier studies that had concluded that saving is not sen-
sitive to the rate of return and therefore also not sensitive to the tax treat-
ment of that return. Because those studies used nominal rather than real
interest rates, the interest rate coefficient was biased in a way that made it
appear to be insignificant or even to have the reverse sign (Feldstein,1970).
New studies that relate saving to an estimate of the real net rate of return
have suggested that savings do respond positively to this more appropriate
measure of the return (Boskin, 1978; Feldstein, 1981). Unfortunately, the
problems of measuring the relevant real expected return are such that the econo-
metric evidenceis never likely to be conpelling. It is important, therefore,
that the general theory of consumer behavior implies directly that a compensated
increase in the real net rate of return necessarily induces individuals to post-
pone consumption. The effect on savings of a change in the taxation of capital
income therefore depends on the timing of tax payments and on the response of
government spending.1' If government spending in each year remalns unchanged,
national saving must rise.If the comnensating changes in the tax keep tax
liabilities in each year unchanged, private saving must also increase. 5
Taxchanges that reduce the difference between the pretax and post—
tax returns on capital may be worthwhile even iF the saving rate does not
respond positively to •tle. et rate of return. A gap between the pretax and]—3—
post—tax rates of return implies a loss of welfare no matter what the uncompen—
sated savings response. Of course, since the revenue lost by reducing the tax
onsavings could alternatively be used to reduce some other distortingtax, the
desirabilityof reducing the tax on saving is not unambiguous. Nevertheless,
recentinvestigations in the theory of optimal taxation do suggestthat the tax
rateon the income from saving should probably be lower, and perhapsvery much
lower, than the tax rate on labor income.If the marginal rateof substitution
betweencurrent consumption and future consumption is independent of the quan-
tities of leisure consumed, the optimal tax rate on the income from savings is
zero (Mirrlees, 1976). Substantial departures from this separability assumption
still leave it optimal to tax capital income less than labor income. Indeed, if
subsidizing retirement consumption reduces the distorting effect of the labor
income tax on preretirement work effort, it may be optimal to "tax" the income
from saving at a negative rate, i.e., to subsidize it. Explicit calculations of
a simple model using empirically plausible but conservative parameter values
(i.e. ,assumingthat the coripensated supply responses of both labor and savinr
are zero) imply that there may be a substantial potential welfare gain asso-
ciated with reducing the tax on capital income and makingupthe lost revenue by
an increase in the tax on labor income (Feldstein, 19713;seealso Green and
Sheshinski, 1979 and Summers, 1980). More generally, the potential gain from
reducing the tax on capital income depends on the extent of the exisLin wedge
between the pretax and net—of—tax rates of return.It issignificant therefore
thatin recent years personal, business andpropertytaxes have taken more than
two—thirds of the real pretax return oncapitalused bynonfinancialcor-
porations(Feldstein and Poterha, 1980)..4
Although economists have generally been concerned with reducingthis
source of welfare loss, the public and Congressional discussionhas focused on
increasingaggregate savings. Moreover, the recent proposals to encourage
saving emphasize the incentive effects of a higher net rate ofreturnand not a
redistributionof disposable income from lower income to higher incore groups.
Indeed, a principal reason for using personal tax changes inaddition to changes
in business tax rules is to permit a targeting of the tax reduction benefits on
middle income taxpayers rather than on all taxpayers in proportion to their
existing wealth.
A further reason for directly encouraging an increase in personal
saving is to reduce the inflationary pressures that might otherwise accompanya
•tax—induced increase in the demand for investment.Although the total rate of
•capital accumulation is constrained by the rate of saving, capitalaccumulation
can be increased without altering the personal tax rules if the corporatetax
rules are changed to increase the rate of return after the corporate income tax.
Thisin turn raises the net return to savers and encourages increased saving.
Ifthe savings response were rapid enough, the econorrpT would shift to a higher
rate of investment with no increase in the rate of inflation.In practice,
however,the corporate tax changes would probably raise investment demand more
rapidlythan the supply of savings. The result would he an increase in infla-
tionary pressure.7 Direct tax noentiVes to save can prevent these inflationary
pressures by causing the increase in saving to occur at the same tine asthe
increasein investment demand.
Twodynamic aspects of saving are particularly important. First,
because saving represents an adjustment of the stock or wealth, a relatively—5—
smallchange in the desired level of wealth can induce a relatively large
increase in the rate of saving. Second, because the desired level of wealth
dependson the expected future net rates of return, an anticipated reduction in
the future rate of tax on investment incone can induce a rise in current saving.
Thus there can bean increasein saving without any concurrent government
deficit.8
There is surprisingly little econometric evidence about individual
saving behavior and the likely magnitude of response to alternative tax rules.
In particular, there is no evidence that deals explicitly with such things as
the anticipated rate of return, the effect of the tax rate per se, or the impact
of nonlinear rules like the naxirincri levels of deductible savings for the current
Individual Ftirement Accounts. Although we cannot fill these gan in thc
current paper, we believe that we can provide some useful inforrtntion on thc
current distribution of saving, wealth and investment incone in relation to tax
rates and total income. This evidence can be used to evaluate the potential
impact and revenue cost of alternate tax rules in a way that is just not
possiblewithout detailed microeconomic evidence.In particular, we focus
attention on the conflict between the desire to linit the individual delucticon
or exclusions (in order to reduce the total revenue lcs and to focus the bene-
fits on middle income taxpayers) and the possibility that such Units would e i —
minateany marginal incentive for most taxpayers.
Our analysis uses to bodies of microecoriomic data. Te principal
data source is the Treasury '5 public use samsi e of individual tax returns. We
use a stratified random sample of 26,63 individual tax returns for 1972 (a
one—in—four random sample of the full puhlic use sample) in cunjunct ion with the-6-
NBER TAXSIMmodel9whichcomputes tax liabilities and tax rates based on the tax
law as of 1912 and the alternative modifications. This data set provides
detailedinformation on currentinterest and dividends, lahor income and total
taxable income for each individual. A special advantage of the 1912 data is
that the exact age of each taxpayer is included (based on I.R.S.examinationof
Social Security Administration records for each individual). Our second body of
data is the 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey of the Bureau of Ihor Statistics.
Although the sample of 1,195 observations is inferior to the TAXSIM data in a
number of ways,-0 ithasthe unique advantage of containing information on indi-
vidual financial saving. Since the TAXSIM sample used in this paper is also for
1972, results obtained with the two data sets are generally comparable.
Althougha great many specific proposals to encourage saving have been
made, all of them have in common the purpose of increasing the net rate o
return on saving or, equivalently, of increasing the amount of future consump-
tion that can be obtained per dollar of current consumption that is foregone.
The proposals that are particularly concerned with saving and that form the
focus of our analysis can usefully be divided into two types:(1) those that
allow the taxpayers to exclude ome amount of saving from taxable income and (2)
those that allow the taxpayer to exclude some amount of interest and dividend
income from taxable income.-- Before examining the specific saving proposals,
we comment briefly on some more general tax proposals that also night encourage
saving.
The most general of these proposals is to replace the income tax with a
tax on consumer spending.12 In coarison to the income tax, a consumption tax
ineffect allowsa deduction for all saving.A more modest partial move in the-7-
direction of a consumption tax would be to adopt a value added tax to replace
part of the current tax structure. This again would he like the deduction
method because income that is saved would avoid the value added tax.
Several general proposals that would reduce the effective tax rate on
interest and dividends have also been actively discussed. Some form of
integration of the corporate and personal taxes (presumably by giving indivi-
duals a credit for corporate taxes in proportion to dividends received) would
raise the net rate of return on equity investment and therefore encourage equity
finance as well as increased saving. The same would be true of a proposal to
permit individuals to exclude a limited amount of dividends that are reinvested
in new issue corporate stock.Adjusting the measurement of interest income to
excludesome or all of the effect of inflation on interest rates would encuurarP
theuse of debt as well as increased saving. The proposals to reduce the maxi-
mum marginal tax rate to 50 percent or to tax "personal services income" and
"investment income" on two separate schedules would raise the net return on all
formsof capital.
Although these general proposals might he useful in encouraging
saving,we shall not explore theth further in the paper in order to concentrate
on the simpler and more direct deduction and exclusion proposals. Section 2
examines the deduction approach and considers the consequences of such a
change in both the short—run transition and the londer run. The next section
then analyzes the short—and long—run consequences of interest and dividend
exclusion proposals. There is a brief concluding section.—8—
2.Deductions for Saving
Under existing law, an individual who is not a participant in an
employer—sponsoredpension plan13 can establish an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) and contribute up to 10 per cent of his wage and salary, with a limit of
$1500 per year. These contributions are deductible from total income in calcu-
lating taxable income and the earnings on the assets in the IRA are not subject
totax. A penalty is imposed if the funds are withdrawn from the IRA befnre
the individual-reaches age 59.Withdrawalsafter that age are taxable as ordi-
nary employment income. The IRA is thus similar to a consumption tax with
respect to the eligible amount of saving.1
Thesaving incentive provided by the IRA could he increased in three
ways:(1) by raising the percentage and/or dollar ceilings on contrihut] ons;
(2) by extending the IRA option to everyone with wage and salary income and not
just to those who are not already participating in a pension plan; and (3) by
increasing the liquidity of the IRA accounts by permitting withdrawals after as
little as (say) four years. To the extent that IRA participants are effec-
tively constrained by either the 10 percent or $1500 limits, the IRA does not
provide any marginal incentive to save more.In the present paper we compare
some of the implications of 10 percent and 15 percent limits with ceilings of
$2000 and $3000. Because higher limits increase the revenue cost of these
plans, we also consider a combination eta higher ceiling and partial deduo—
t ibility, e.g. ,alloyingan individual to contribute iS percent of earnings up
to $3000 but deduct only half of this amount. ouch partial deduction plans
increase the range of margi cal effectiveness although, for previously istra—
marginal contributions ,theyreduce the incentive as we.l as the cost.( ReceHe—9—
the 1972 tax return data do not separate the earnings of husbands and wives, all
of the proposals are defined in terms of the taxpaying unit rather than the
individual.
The current rule that limits eligibility for an IRA to those who do
not participate in employer pension plans eliminates approximately 50 percent of
all employees.15 Moreover, those employees without pension coverage tend to be
those who are least likely to save and least likely to be affected by tax
cobsiderations; they have low incomes and are frequently quite youngJ6 The
current eligibility limit thus eliminates substantially more than 50 percent of
those who would be encouraged by saving d
available. The current paper examines a
individuals with wage and salary income
Finally, the restriction that funds most re
individual reaches age 59(orhe subject to a special
penalties) substantially reduces the liquidity of the
individuals, this reduction in liquidity mayoutweigh
returnthat the IP offers. An individual at age
funds for 19 years even in exchange for a higher rate
quidity could be eliminated by allowing individuals t
shortperiod like four years between withdrawing the
amount) or
period.In practice, individuals who are reluctant to count funds for a very
long period may decide sequentially to leave the funds in the IRA account rather
than pay the tax on the withdrawal. Although we have no way to examine this
issue with the existing data, fbi s possibility for noticing IRA accounts none





main in the IRA until the
withdrawal tax and other
IRA savings. For many
the higher net—of—tax
nay be unwilling to connit
of return. This illi—
o choose at the end of a
funds in the account (and
for another four year paying tax on the "rolling o\rer" the fundsA
—10—
attractive should 'he borne in mind when considering the likely responses to
extending the IRA option to all individuals.
Ifthe savings deduction is judgedas an incentive to a higher rate of
saving,18there are three potential problems. First, during a transition
period after the tax law is changed, individuals can reduce their tax liability
without any increase in saving by transferring previously accumulated assets
intothe special account. Under an IRA—type plan with a ten percent limit, an
individual with assets equal to one year's earnings could obtain the maximum
savingdeduction for a decade without doing any additional saving. Indeed, for
such an individual, the tax change would provide no marginal incentive to save
while the tax reduction for previous saving would increase disposable income and
•therefore presumahl..y cause an increase inconsumer spending. 19 extentto
•which this is a prOblem depends on the amount of financial, assets (relative to
earnings)that individuals have available and on their willingness to sacrifice
the liquidity of those assets by committing then to an IRA.20 We shall examine
indetail the amount of financial assets that iodivi duals have and the potential
revenue effect if these assets were transferred to a special savings account
during a transition period after the introduction of a savings deduction rule.
The second potential problem with a savings deduction plan is that,
even after the transition period in which individuals merely transfer pre-
existing assets into a special. savings account, there would he some individuals
for whom a saving deduction with dollar and percentage limits would provide
either no marginal incentive or a marginal incentive that is small relative to
the intramarginal tax reduction. Thus an individual earning $10,000 and saving
$900 might increase his saving by$100to the $1000 maximum allowed by a 10 per——11—
cent ceiling but would receive a tax reduction on the entire $1000 amount.With
even a 20 percent marginal tax rate, the tax cost would be double the induced
saving.Weshall investigate the potential importance of the problem by examin-
ing the current distribution of saving relative to wage and salary income and
the potential savings and revenue effects if individuals respond in different
ways to the change in tax rules.
The third problem is that individuals nay not be very responsive to
the change in the net rate of return implied by the saving deduction. Because
we are uncertain about the likely response, we shall present results for several
different behavioral assumptions. At one extreme, we assume no behavioral
response. At the other, we assume that all individuals take maximum advantage of
•the potential deduction. We also investigate a response described in terms of
•the elasticity of current consumption with respect to the marginalrate of
transformationbetweencurrent and future consumption.
Before looking at the specific results, four notes of caution are
appropriate. First,our analysis is only a partial equilibrium one. Weassume
thatinterest rates and other faotor incomes remain unchanged. Second, the onhy
behavioralresponse that we consider is saving. Since a higher net rate of
return improves the trade—off between current work and future consumption, some
individualsmay respond by working more. Their savi of: would increase even if
their saving rate remained unchanged. Of course, for some individuals thu
income effect would domi nate and work effort would be dcc ceased. 21 We Ign ore
any such change in work effort and labor income. Third, we do not adopt an
explicit life cycle framework for ouranalysis.This implies that we do not—12--
take age explicitly into account in calculating the response to tax rules22 and
that we do not deal separately with the increased saving of the saving cohorts
andtheir subsequent increased dissaving. Analyzing the complex dyrnimics 01'
explicitintertemporal optimization would require much betterdatathan
currentlyexist. Moreover, there is no agreement on the extent to which indivi-
dualsavingdoes correspond to suchrational life—cycle optimization. Finally,
we consider only limited tax consequences; in particular, we ignore the effects
of' increased accumulation on corporate tax revenue.
2.1 Asset Transfers during Transition
We begin our analysis by examining the extent to which individuals
couldrespond to an expanded TEAprogram by transferring preexisting assets
into the special saving accOunts. The data that we present show that this is a
relatively unimportantproblemexcept perhaps for those withrelativelyhigh
incomes -
Table1 presents the cuiiulative distribution of gross financial assets
in each income class based on the 1912 Thx Model. Althoughthe tax returns do
not report financial assets as such, the gross financial assets can be
estimated from the reported interet and dividends. For this rurpose, wehave
used a uniform dividend yield of three percent for all taxpayers andauniform
interest rate of 1.5 percent.23 It may be useful to hear in mind that in 1912
per capita disposable personal income was $OROTandby 1980 it had somewhat more
than doubled (in current prices)to $8010. The popuLationto which this tahula—
tion refers includes all faniUes and unrelated individuals, except those
headed bysomeone aged 65 or older. Note that among those with incomes under
$10,000 (approximately$20,000 t1980level) ,19percenthadless than or equa'—13—
TableI




Assets 0—10 10—20 20—30 30+ All
$0 69 38 16 6 55
$1000 79 514 27 10 66
$2000 83 63 3)4 13 72
$5000 89 75 20 80
$10,000 93 8)4 62 28 By
$20,000 96 91 714 39 92
$14o,ooo 98 96 85 5)4 95
Source: 1972 Tax Model.Dividend and interest are cap.itaJized at 0.03 and o.o
respectively. Ind vi duals over age 6 are exe ludeci.Source: 1972 Thx Model.
Cumulative percentaqe of
worth of financial asset
ceiling of $2000, soLely
excluded. Dividends and
respectively.
taxpayers without the indicated
s to finance an IRA equal to l0
from those assets. Individuals
interest are capitalized at .03
number of years
of waqes, with a
over ae 65 are
and .0115
Table 2






0—10 10—20 20—30 30+
1 79 6o 39 27 69
2 82 69 147 31 75
3 814 73 514 314 18
14 85 7 60 36 80
5 86 80 611 38 82
6 87 82 68 110 83
7 88 811 70 81 85
8 89 8 73 1111 86
9 90 8 11 86 8
10 90 88 76 hy 88
11 91 89 79 149 88
12 91 89 79 50 89
13 91 90 81 52 89
111 91 91 82 53 90
15 91 91 82 58 90
16 91 92 82 55 90
17 92 92 8 55 91
18 93 93 811 57 92
19 93 93 85 58 92—15—
to $1000 of gross financial assets. Only 11 percent had as much as $5000.
Since our concern is with the extent to which individuals could use
existingfinancial assets to contribute to an IRA—type plan without doing any
new saving, we have also restated these estimates of gross financial assets in
termsof the number of years that they could be used to fund the maximum IRA—
type contribution for which the individual is eligible. For example, with an
allowable IRA—type contribution equal to 10 percent of income with a maximum of
$2000, an individual earning $15,000 with $1000 of gross financial assets would
have enough to finance somewhat more than 4yearsof maximum IRA contributions.
Table 2 shows the cumulative distribution of "potential years" for taxpayers
grouped by income class based on IRA's equal to the lesser of $2000 and 10 per—
•cent of wage and salary income. These data exclude taxpayers over age 65 and
•
apply the IRA rule to taxpaying units rather than separately to each individual.
Note that in the class with adjusted gross incomes of less than $io,ooo, 79 per-
cent did not have enough financial assets to finance even a single year's
maximum IRA contribution. Since this under $10,000 group contained 60 percent
of all taxpayers below age 65,itisclear that for the great majority of tax-
payers there is little problem ofasubstantial revenue loss while these indivi-
duals finance IRA—type contributions out of previously accumulated assets.
Even in the higher incone group with 1972 adjusted gross incomes oC $io,000 to
$20,000, 60percent lacked even one year's worth of IRA contributions at, tHe
maximum allowable rate. Only about 15 p'rcent of taxpayers with ACT' s hclov
$10,000 and 20 percent with AOl's betwcen $10,000 and $20,000 had enongh finan-
cialassets to finance as much as five years' of contributions.Table 3 presents the aggregate implications of this potential asset
transfer for a saving deduction plan that allows contributions of 10 percent of
income with a $2000 annual maximum. The table shows thai; the rnaxion'rnr cord; rthir—
tion that individuals could legally deduct totalled $56.1 billion or slightly
more than $800 per taxpayer. By contrast, the maximum amount that could be
financed by transfers from existing assets in the first year was only $26.9
billion.It should be emphasized that this maxirmim transfer would occur only if
all taxpayers were prepared to lose the liquidity of these assets in order to
obtainthe higher net—of—tax return.(Note that because of the $2000 ceiling
approximatelyfour—fifths of this deduction accrues to those with incomes below
$20,000 and nearly all of it to those with increases below $30,000.)
The distribution of assets in Thles 1 and 2 implies that this first
year transfer would exhaust much of the available assets of most taxpayers. The
final column of Table 3 confirns the importance of this by tabulating the amount
of preexisting assets that could be transferred, in the third year of such a new
tax rule. The total anunt of transferable assets is reduced from $32 billion
toonly $ii billion, or less than one—third of the maximum potential
contribution in that year.
Ininterpreting the revenue losses associated with asset transfers, it
is important to bear in mind that they represent a one—tine fixed cost of tran-
sition to a new system. The true economic cost of this revenue lee;; is not the
revenue loss itself but the such smaller excess burden that would he incurred in
making up this lost revenue or that oth'rwise could have been avoidnd if the
lost revenue had instead been used to reduce some other distortingr tax. The—17—
Table3
Aggregate Effects of Alternative
Savings Deduction Plans
MU-lions of Maximum Contributionsfrom Class Returns Contribution Assets
($1000) Year 1 Year 3
($billion) (5bIllion) ($billion)
0—10 2.2 17.9 5.1 3.1
10—20 22.2 28.6 i8. 8.1
20—30 i.l .2 5.2 3.6
30+ 1.6 2.i 2.1 1.9
All 70.0 56.1 26.9 16.8
Source:1972 Tax Model
Potential reductions in taxable income withthe introduction of a universal IRA. The maximum deduction is 10 percent ofwaes with a cejHn of 2QQQ. Individualsover age age 65areexcluded.—iB—
corresponding gain is the present value of the perpetual reduction in theexcess
burden caused by the incorrect x of taxes on capital and laborincomes.
Because this is a comparison of a one—tine cost with aperpetual gain ina
growing econorr', the one—time transition cost is likely to herelatively small.
2.2 Marginal and Intrainarginal Saving After the Transition
Afterthe transition period, an individual can have a tax deduction
only for net saving that actually adds to individual wealth and the national
capital stock.2 Of course, some of this saving wouldhavebeen done anay.
Moreover, for those individuals who would in any case have savedmore than the
maximum deductible amount, the deductible saving wouldbe intramarginal and the
taxrule would influence saving only by an income effect. Forsuch individuals,
since some of the tax reduction would he spent, the net effectwould he an
increase in consumption. But for thoseindividualswho would otherwisehave
saved less than the deductible amount, the new rule wouldprovide a marginal
incentive to save. If however, the saving would have been closeto the limit,
theincreased saving may be constrained to be less than the taxreduction.
To shed some light on this issue, we have exanineil thedistribution of'
existing savingratesrelative to wageand salary income.For this purpose, we
use the 1912 Consumer Expenditure Survey and define saving as the'change in
nominalnet financial assets, excluding the appreciation ofportfolio assets.'
We use this definition of saving (rather thansaythechangeinnet worth)
because this defines the kind of saving for which the taxdeduction wo1d he
allowed. We then use this information tocalculatetheaoount of ir1trnnarLIna1
savingand other preexisting saving for which taxpayers wouldreceive deductinrir—19—
and compare this to the potential increases in saving that might be induced
under different assumptions about the behavioral response of taxpayers. The
effects on tax revenue are also calculated.
Tablepresents the cumulative distributions of the ratio of net
financial saving to wage and salary income for four income classes as well as
for households as a whole.It is clear that a 10 percent limit on deductible
saving would be a binding constraint for only a small fraction of all
households. Among those with income below $10,000, only 1)4 percent saved 10
percentof their income in the form of financial asset accumulation. The frac-
tion is essentially the same for those with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000.
Among those with incomes over $20,000, the $2000 limit on saving deductibility
becomesthe constraint instead of the 10 flercent limit. This implies that
deductibility would beintramarginal for a larger fraction of these taxpayers.
Butthe figures for the $20,000 to $30,000 class imply thatonly aboutone in
fivewould otherwise be at or above the deductibility limit.
Anotherstriking feature of Table )4 isthe very high fraction of
We have prepared simulations to compare the effects on saving and tax
revenue of four alternative saving deductionsandseveral different posib]e
households who report no change intheirgross
cent of all households indicate some reduction
year nd an additional 37 percentindicate nei
39 percentreport positive saving. A tax rule
wouldprovide an unambiguous incentive to save
or negative saving since there would hr nooff
withpreexisting saving (Feldstein and Psiang,
financial assets. Some 2)4 per—
in financial assets during the
ther saving nor dissaving. Only
allowing deductibility of saving
foreto the (0 percent with zero
setting income effect associated
19GB).—20—
Table
Cumulative Distribution of the Ratio of




in Financial Assets 0—10 10—20 20—30 30+ All
toWage and Salary
Income
15 16 18 12 15
—0.02 19 20 18 15 19
<0 23 26 28 20 28
0 69 51 89 8i 61
0.02 '76 69 59 58 To
0.08 80 68 63 77
o.o6 83 81 80
0.08 85 88 '1' 69 83
0.10 86 8 79 '72 85
0.12 88 88 86 '73
0.15 89 90 86 77
0.18 90 91 18 90
0.36 98 96 98 88 95
Source:1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey
Tabulations exclude households with no wage or salary income-a
—21--
behavioral responses. The two basic savings deductions are 10 percent of earn-
ings with a $2000 limit and 15 percent of earnings with a $3000 limit. A more
restrictedalternative that reduces the revenue loss without changing the seL of
taxpayers for whom the deduction provides a marginal incentive would limit the
tax deduction to only half of the contribution to the saving plan; i.e. ,atax-
payer with earnings of $15,000 could contribute up to $1500 but would receive a
tax deduction for only $150. The earnings on all the assets in the fund would,
however, be untaxed. The final option presented in this table is designed to
offset the fact that higher income taxpayers already save a larger fraction of
their income than low income taxpayers. For taxpayers with incomes over
$10,000, it restricts the deduction to the excess over a "floor" equal to 5per-
cent of the earnings over $10,000. For example, a taxpayer with earningsof
$20,000could only deduct savings contributions in excess of $500.Such a tax-
payercould contribute an additional $2000 hut would receive a deduction only of
$2000 for the $2500 contribution. This would have no adverse incentive effect
on anyone who would save at least five percent under existing tax rules.
Moreover, even the initial five percent has some incentive effect associated
withitsince the income on alltheassets inthe fund is untaxed. Indeed, for
some high incometaxpayers for whom the $2000 ceiling is a binding limit, the
ability to contribute an additional five percent of nondeductible earnings nay
be an incentive tosave.25
For each of the four alternative plans, we have calculated the in -:
insavings anddecrease in tax revenue implied byseveralalternative hehaviora
response assumptions. The first assumption, that there is no change in saving,—22—
providesa reference standard for comparing the tax revenue implicationsof
alternative behavioral responses. At the opposite extreme would be the assump-
tionthat taxpayers increase their saving to themaximum amount of the allowed
deduction.It seems very unlikely, however, that individualswho currently do
no saving would suddenly switch to this maximum amount. We havetherefore exa-
mined two alternatives that are much more conservative. The first assumption is
that only those who currently have positive saving would switch to the maximum,
with no change in the behavior of nonsavers. The alternative assumption is that
taxpayers with positive assets would take the maximum deductionwhile those with
concept in this calculation is the relative "price of current consumptionin
terms of foregone future consumption. Consider an individual who decides bet-
ween spending a dollar now or saving it and spending the principal and accumu-
lated interest at the end of T years.26Let the nominal interest rate he L,
the inflation rate he v, and the individual' s marginal tax rate he 0.Under
currentlaw, the individual chooses between spending $1 nowand spending
(1+(1_0)f)T dollars in year T. The real value of that T—th year spending is
(l±(l_O)i)T/(l±r)T, or, ignoring terms that are of second order, (l÷(l_0)ia)T.
e shall callthis rate of fornationR0.If theindividual could instead
no assets would not
mediate response:
halfway from his ac
payer with $15,000




respond at all. A fourth assumption is an arbitrary inter—
each taxpayer who has positive saving increases his saving
tual 1972 level to the maximum amount. For example, a tax—
of earnings and $500 of preexisting annual savings would,
plan, increase his saving to $1000.
three behavioral response calculations reflect the assurnp—
spending responds to the income and substitution effects of
constant partial price and income elasticities. The basic
a—23—
deductthe dollar of saving, by foregoing one dollar of current consumption he
could add 11(1—0) dollars to his current savings. If the saving accumulates
untaxed, this grows to (l+i)TI(l_0) dollars at the end of T years. The indivi-
dual pays tax on this nominal value, although presumably at a lower tax rate
(o'<0)because he is then retired. The net of tax accumulation is thus (i—o')
(1÷1)T/(1e)•In real terms this is (again ignoring second order terms)
=(1—0')(l+i_r)T/(l_0).2T
Note that if 0' =0,the combination of deductibility and the non—
taxation of the interest on the saving acccount is equivalent to having no
deduction and then allowing the saving to accumulate completely untaxed (i.e.
with no tax when funds are disbursed from the account). This is equivalent to
consumption tax treatment and removes the distortion in the individual's choice
between early and late consumption. JIoever, the distortion between leisure and
consumption (both present and future) remains and presumably biases the
individual's decision in favor of leisure. At the alternative extreme in which
withdrawals from the fund at retirement are untaxed (0' =0),the individual
chooses between one dollar of current 000sumptlOn and (i+i_r)T/(l_0) dollars of
consumption in year T. This represents a more favorable tradeoff between
current and future consumption than a consumption tax and thus distorts consump-
tion in favor of theretirement years. But because itpermitsthe individual t
transforma dollar of pretax earnings into retirement consumption at the real
rate of interest, such treatment offsets the biasagainstworking that is
Inherent in the consumption tax. Indeed, with 00 this method is equivalent
to no tax at all as far as the trade—off between current leisure and future con-
sumption is concerned.
For the purpodof the simulations,we approximate the change in con.-sumptiori as the sumofa price effect and an income effect:




where C is consumption, H is the price of current consumption (in terms of
foregonefuture consumption) and Y is disposable income. From 2. 1 it directly
follows that
(2.2) dCH DCdR Y DCdY
C C DR P C DY Y
=ap dR
H Y
where ap and ay arc the price and income elasticities. We shallassume that
these partial price and incone elasticities are locally constant.
We use this approximation to calculate the level ofconsumption under
the deduction rule (C1) as a function of the initial consumption level(C0), the
two related price values (H1 and H0) and the income effect of the taxchange
(dY). For simplicity, we shall describe this in thecase where the individual
initially has a positive level of saving (00 >0)but in which the deduction
limi is never binding (i.e., both 00 and the level ofsaving under the deduc-
tion rule, S1, are less than the limit, L).In this ease, the relative price
increasecaused by the deduction rule is dR/H =(HJ
—R0)/H0.rftle income eftect
depends on the change in income caused l the deduction rule at the initial
level of saving. Recall that under current tax law the individualwho saves
S0 "buys" future consumption of S0R0. With the deduction rule, this same level
of future consumption can be bought at the lower currentcost, R009/R1 .The
difërence between these to is the increase inincome at the initial consl:ip—tion pattern. Thus dY =Sj— = s0(R1—R0)/R1.Substituting these
expressions into equation 2.2 we obtain:
R1—R0 So(Rl—Ho) — +cty
It is clear that equation 2.3 is only an approximate measure of the
individual's saving rate remained relatively constant
the use of 50/Y0 instead of a ratio of two discounted
the result appreciably.)
The magnitudes of the income and substitution effects determine
whether the switch to a deduction rule raises or lowers consumption. The effect
on saving can then be calculated from the change in consumption and the change
in tax revenue:
(2J1) (s1—s0) +(cc0)+(TT—TO)=
whereTp is the individual's tax liability under current tax law and T1 is the
tax liability under the deduction rule. Fur an individual whose final level of
savings is below the deduction limit, T1 —Tg=
—OS1,i.e., the individual's tax





(2.3) ________ _____ _________
changein consumption. We use the linear approximation of
evaluate it at the initial values of R0 and We define
include all uses of income other than financial saving and
ticular, we include mortgage repayments in consumption. Mo
at a single year in isolation. In a full life cycle model,
would be more complex, the income change would reflect the
the price changes in future years as well, and the initial
















deduction Cs1). Note that equation 2.1-i implies that even if the income and
substitution effects on consumption balance so that consumption remains
tial saving is negative (5 c 0), there is neither an
effect. Both consumption and saving remain unchanged.
saving, there is a price effect but no income effect;
saving rises. For an individual whose initial saving
limit >L),there is no price effect (since R1 =
givenby L(R1 —Rü)/51;consumption rises and savings
Finally, for an individual whose initial level of savings is below the ceiling
(o CL)but for whom equation 2.3 and 2. imply that lexceedsthe ceiling, we
takesavings to be either the limit or, if it is greater, the value of savings
irrqlied by the income effect alone.
Inall of our simulations, we assume a unit elasticity ofconsumption
with respect to disposah].e income: °y =1.Since we lack reliable econometric
evidence on a, we perform simulations for a range of values. At one extreme ic
the case of a =0,i.e. ,nosubstitution effect.In this implausible limitinu
case, the only response to the tax change is the income effect and therefore an
increase in consumption. More generally, 5R < 0 and theresponse of consooptioc
depends on the relative pngth of substitution and income effect-s. Since
unchanged (01 —C0=0),savingwill increase
—o>0if T1 —T0C0).Of course, the
price incentive and cause consumption to rise
To evaluate this in the current case, we need
economic distributions of tax rates, savings,
Befote discussing the values of a5
three special cases where saving is negative,
comment briefly on
if the tax liability falls
income effect could dominate the
by enough to leave savings lower.
values of a5 and czy and the micro—
and incomes.
and czy, we may
zero or above the limit. If mi—




o) and an income effect
mayriseor fall.—27—
intuition about consumer behavior is in terms of the uncompensated price elasti-
city rather than the pure pribe effect, we derive sinu1ation values of a0 from
assumptions about the uncompensated response cf consumption for a "reprecentative"
taxpayer with disposable income of Y0 =$10,000,savings of 00 =$200and a
marginal tax rate of 0 =0.25.To calculate the values of E0 and 01, let i =
0.10be the nominal interest rate and it= 0.08be the rate of inflation. Assume
that the time to retirement consumption is T =15years and that in retirement
the individual's marginal tax rate will be half what it is now:0' =0.500.
Then0o =(1+(l—0)i—)T=(1+.075—.08)15=0.93and El =(1—0')
(l÷i_ii)T/ (1—0) =0.875(l.02)-5/0.75 =1.57.ThusEl/Ho =1.69.
Consider first the case in which a change in the net rate of return
has no effect on consumption: 01 =C0.Equation 2.3 then implies that
El—Ho So(Ri—Ho)
(2.5) 0a0 +ay 1001




These specific assumptions for our representative taxpayer then imply a0=
—0.0118.Frote that although this value of a0 implies that the income and
substitutioneffects balance and leave consumption unchanged for the
"representative" taxpayer, someone with a lower initial saving rate will have a
smaller income effect and will, therefore, he induced by the deduction rule to
reduce consumption while someone with a higher initial savings rate will he
induced to increase consumption.
We also present imulations based on the annirnpt ion that an increaoc—28—
in the net rate of return would cause our representative taxpayer's consumption
to decrease, i.e., that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect.
More specifically, we approximate the consumption response of this type of
"representative" taxpayer to deductibility as a two percent decrease in consimip—
tion. Equation 2.3 then implies
(2.7) —0.02 = 1.57—0.93+0.02(1.57—0.93)
0.93 1.57
or aR =
Therelation between these responses ofa"representative" individual
andthe aggregate responses that we obtain in the simulations reflects the
distribution of initial saving rates and price changes and the effects of the
deductibility ceilings. We should again emphasize that these calculations are
not precise estimates but are approximations for a broad range of pararvter
values. A more complete analysis would instead derive each individual's con-
sumption response with the help of an explicit utility function in a life cycle
context. Realistic life cycle calculations would have to take into account
bequests and inheritances as well as family structure, private pension henefit,
Social Security, etc. Liquidity considerations and the possibLe favorable
misunderstanding of the deductibility should also be considered. At this time,
there is just not enough information to perform such a calculation.
In the simulationswecalculate two different measures of theeffect
ofthe deduction on tax revenue. The first of these is the short—run effect
that results from the immediate deduction oC the savings deposited in the spe-
cial account. This is approximately equal to the product of the individual's—29—
marginal tax rate and the lesser of savings (s1) and the ceiling on the
savings deduction. In fact, we use the Tax Model to calculate more precisely
the effect of the savings deduction in a way that takes into account the non-
linearity of the tax schedule and other features of the tax law. Of course, for
taxpayers with negative savings, there is no change in tax revenue.
Because withdrawal of funds from the savings account requires paying
tax, the initial deduction is in part only a postponement of the tax liability.
Indeed, if the tax rate in retirement is equal to the tax rate when working
(0' =0),the initial deduction is fully offset by the subsequent withdrawal
tax. The advantage of the deduction account is then only that the income on the
assets accrues without tax. More generally, the long—run reduction in tax reve-
nue reflects both the lower tax rate when funds are withdrawn (O'< 8) and the
exclusion from taxable income of the interest and dividend income on the amount
of savings that would have been done under the old law (since the income on the
induced saving would not otherwise exist).
We calculate the long—run revenue loss by noting first that the ini-
tial level of saving S grows under current law to R0S0 before it is consumed
while, with the deductions, it grows to The entire difference, (51—R0)50,
is the accumulated value of the lower taxes that the governrent collects on
2oandon the resulting interest and dividend income. The present value of that
differenceas of the initial date, discounting at the real pretax rate of
returns, is (51_50)S5/(l+i_n)T. This is the present value of the revenue loss
associated with the initial level of savings. The additional saving causes an
additional revenue loss to the extent that the tax rate in retirement (3')is
less than the tax rate at the time that the deduction is taken. If S1 is i ens—30—
than the deduction limit, the initial revenue loss on the induced saving is
e(s1—s0). The induced saving grows over time to (S1—S0) (i+i_ir)T and yields a
tax revenue of O(s1_s0)(l+i_)T/(l+i_)T =e'(S1—s)).The net revenue lo; on
the induced saving is thus (O—O')(S1---S0). The full long—run reduction in
revenue (associated with the single year's saving) thus has a present value of
(Rl_o)so/(1+i_u)T +(o—o')(s1—s0).The simulations modify this formula in the
appropriate way in the cases where initial saving is negative or where the limit
ondeductibility is binding 29and use the full tax simulation calculations
instead of just the marginal tax rate.
Table 5summarizesthe results of these simulations. Consider first
theeffects of the alternative plans on tax revenue iftaxpayers do not adjust
their saving at all. A savings deduction limited by 10 percent ofwages and
$2000 would have an immediate revenue cost of $i9. The present value of the
fulllong—run tax effect is slightly larger, $60,implyingthe exclusion of the
interest and dividends outweighs the recouping of part of the initial deduction.
Increasing the limits by 50 percent (to 15 percent of wages -and $3000) increases
the initial cost by proportionally less hut increases the long—run deduction by
almost 50 percent. This indicates that the primary value totaxpayersof the
higher limits is in the implied interest and dividend exclusion. Finally, note
that while cutting thedeductionin half obviously halves the short—run revenue
loss,the long—run revenue effect is much less.
Consider now the effects of the al terrative saving responses to the 0
percent deduction limit,if taxpayers who already do some saving increase their
savingto takefull advantage of the deductions, average saving would rise by












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































$49to $85. The present value of the long—run revenue loss would also rise, but
by proportionately less since the increase reflects the differences between the
initialdeduction and the present value of the extra revenue obtained whenthe
funds are withdrawn. The corresponding figures when the response is limited to
those who initially had positive assets or when the size of the response is
halved are similar although obviously somewhat smaller.
The partial price elasticity associated with unchanged consumption for
the representatiie taxpayer (aR =—0.0118)causes saving to rise by an average
of $58 per taxpayer. The immediate revenue loss associated with this is $47 and
the long—run revenue loss is $57. Thus in this case, the increased personal
saving exceeds the immediate reduction in personal tax revenue and is approxima-
tely equal to the long—run tax reduction. If the incentive to postpone consump-
tion does cause a fall in consumption, theincreasein saving exceeds the short—
run and long—run loss of tax revenue.
Since all of these figures are means per taxpayer and there were 70
million taxpayers in 1972, these estimates imply that the immediate revenue cost
of a 10 percent deduction plan is a minimum of $3.5 billion (at 1972 levels)
with no saving response. Beyond that, each dollar of induced saving reduces
revenue by only about 20 cents. With consumption unchanged, the revenue loss is
$3.5 billion and the increased saving is $4 billion. With consumption reduced by
two percent, the revenue loss is somewhat less than $5 billion and the saving
increase is about $10 billion.
Tables 6 and 7 analyze the effects of a savings deduction by income

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































spending and examines the impact on saving and taxes of alternative deduction
plans. It is clear that the basic deduction of 10 percent of wages with a $2000
limit induces proportionally more response at each higher level of income.
Note that switching from a 10 percent, $2000 limit to a 15 percent, $3000 limit
has virtually no effect except in the highest income group. Table I focuses just
on the 10 percent, $2000 deduction limit but examines the responses in each
income class associated with different types of behavior. One point worth
noting is that the effect of different price elasticities on the amount of
saving is proportionately greater for low income taxpayers than for high income
taxpayers. Note also that, regardless of the price elasticity, there is little
tax reduction below $10,000 and that above $10,000 the tax reduction rises at
least in proportion to income.
3. Exclusion of Interest and Dividends
Until 1980, an individual taxpayer could exclude the first one hundred
dollars of dividend income from adjusted gross income and therefore from taxable
income. A couple could exclude twice that amount. The law was modified in 1980
to double these exclusions and to extend them from dividends to both dividends
and in1erest. For anyone with interest and dividend income below the limit, the
exclusion effectively eliminates the tax on such income at the margin and there-
fore has the full neutrality of a consunption tax.
The principal problem with the current exclusion is that the limit nay
be toolow. For a couple with more than tOOof interest and dividends, the
exclusionisintramarginal and has no effect on the taxation of additions to
wealth. With today's interest rates, a couple with as little as $11000 of wealth—36—
could easily find that the income that results from any additional saving would
be fully taxed. This section considers alternative proposals to raise the limit
on the exclusion. To reduce the cost of such an increase, we also consider two
partial exclusion plans (the first plan excludes 20 percent of all interest and
dividend income while the second plan excludes one half of the first $1000 of
interest and dividend Income)30 and a plan with a floor (individuals with inco-
mes in excess of $10,000 can only exclude interest and dividend income to the
extent that it exceeds five percent of the income over $10,000 and then only up
to a limit of $1000).
From the taxpayers' point of view, the interest and dividend exclusion
has two advantages over a savings deduction that implies the same real net rate
of return. First, because the interest and dividend exclusion is not restricted
to a separate account, there is no loss of liquidity to counterbalance the
increase in yield. Second, there are no additional accounting or record keeping
requirements. Both of these features suggest that, all other things equal,
individuals are likely to be more responsive to an exclusion than to a savings
deduction. Against this might be balanced the "psychological effect of the
savings deductions In focusing attention on an immediate tax reward for saving.
We know of no evidence on the basis of which this can be evaluated.
The dividend and interest exclusion also has the advantage that there
is no transition problem comparable to the transfer of existing assets that
occurs with a savings deduction, Of course, the interest and dividend exclusion
has an analogous problem since taxes are reduced immediately on the interest and
dividends earned on preexisting wealth. But this problem does not just apply—37—
during the transition. Rather, with the interest and dividend exclusion, there
is no real distinction between the initial "transition" tax reductions and the
subsequent"steady state" reduction in taxes that result from assets that would
have existed even without the exclusion.
Theprincipal issue in judgingthe potential usefulness of the
interestand dividend exclusion is the amount of additional saving that is
generated per dollar of foregone tax revenue. Of course, there is no revenue
loss directly caused by the increased accumulation of wealth induced by the new
tax rule. The interest and dividends that go untaxed would not have existed
otherwise and therefore obviously would not have been taxed. All of the revenue
loss is due to the exclusion of interest and dividends or wealth that would have
•existed in any case.3- This revenue loss therefore depends on the distribution
•
of existing interest and dividends, the limit on the exclusion, and the fraction
thatis excluded if less than a full exclusion. Section 3.1 presents evidence
on this distribution.
In evaluating the likely response to an interest and dividend
exclusion, we give particular attention to those who currently have zero
interest and dividends. As the data in section 2 on the distribution of gross
financialassets implied, this is a very sizeable group. Asong taxpayers as a
whole, 46 percent had no interest and dividends. The concentration of indivi-
duals at zero reflects a kink in the intertemporal budget constraint. Even in
the absence of taxes, the budget constraint would be kicked at the point ofzero
saving,reflecting the fact that the borrowing rate exceeds the rate that indi-
viduals receive on deposits. Since most taxpayers do not itemize their—38—
deductions, the tax rules leave the borrowing rate unchanged hut reduce the net
lending rate even more.32
Because of the kink, individuals with different preferences wii.l have
the same behavior. Because the reason that a particular individual has zero
interestand dividends in equilibrium cannot be determined from the available data,
the likely effect of a tax change is ambiguous as well. Figure 1 illustrates
this ambiguity in a two—period model of income and consumption. In both parts
of this figure,line ABC represents a constant interest rate budget line between
current and future consumption. At point B, the individual neither borrows nor
lends. The tax on interest income shifts the lending segment of the budget
constraint from BC to BE. The higher interest rate on borrowing than on lending
shifts the borrowing segment from AR to DR.
In figure IA,the individual faced with the constant interest rate
budgetline ABC would choose to save and therefore to consume at point X.But
with the kinked budget line DBE, the individual chooses point B with no
borrowing and lending.In figure lB, the individual faced with line ABC would
chooseto borrow and therefore to consume at point Y. But with the kinked budget
lineDBE, this individual also chooses point B. The exclusion of interest and
dividend income would raise the savings segment of the budget line from BE to
BC. In figure IA, this induces the individual to save and shifts the
equilibrium from B to X; in contrast, in figure lB this has no effect on the
individual's behavior. Because we only observe that the individual is now at
point B and cannot distinguish between the IA and lB situations, the effect of



















Wemight in principle reduce the uncertainty by distinguishing be-
tween those individuals with zero interest and dividends who also borrow and
those who do not. The borrowers are in equilibrium on segment BI) andwouldnot.
be influenced by a shift in the lending line from BE to BC. The ambiguity would
therefore pertain only to those who were truly at point B with no borrowing as
well as no lending. There are two difficulties with this line of reasoning.
The first is a practical one: information on borrowing is only available for
itemizers and is. therefore not available for the majority of taxpayers and for
an even larger share of the group without interest and dividends since itemizing
of deductions is relatively uncommon in this group. But even if information on
borrowing were available, there would he a problem since many individuals both
borrow and lend. Since the borrowing is generally at a higher interest rate
than the lending (typically consumer credit and savings accounts), the observed
behavior reflects considerations of liquidity and convenience and therefore can-
not be reconciled with the simpler analysis of figure 1.
Since the prospective behavior of those who currently have no interest
or dividends is inherently ambiguous, we present simulations based on two alter-
native assumptions about this grOup. The first type of simulation makes the
very conservative assumption that all individuals would prefer to be borrowing
and therefore do not change their saving in response to an interest and dividend
exclusion rule. The alternative sets of simulations assume that all indivi-
duals respond by increasing their wealth to take at least some advantage of the
exclusion; no distinction is made between those who initially have interest and
dividend income and those who do not. This behavior is consistent with figure—4l—
1A (although with the individual switching from B to a point that mayinduce
less saving than at X if the exclusion limit is binding). Further information
about the simulation method as well as the simulation results will be presented
in section 3.2
3.1 The Distribution of Interest and Dividend Income
The current distribution of interest and dividend
the tax revenue effects of various exclusion limits and the
changes in the limits can have marginal incentive effects.
data presented in this section, it is important to bear in
level of per capita income was approximately double the 19
that the typical taxpayer in 1980 had approximately twice
cial assets. Moreover, the level of interest rates and th
also doubled between 1972 and 1980. Thus, a taxpayer who
and dividends in 1972 probably had about $800 in 1980.
Table 8 presents the cumulative frequency distribution of interest and
dividend income by AGI class. Note that 6 percent of all taxpayers had no
interest and dividend income and that an additional 25 percent had between $1 and
$200 of such income. Introducing.a $200 exclusion would thus provide an increase
in the marginal real net interest rate for 11 percent of taxpayers while giving
a tax reduction with no marginal incentive effect to the remaining 29 percent.
Extending the exclusion fran $200 to $10Owouldadd an additional 1 percent to
thenumber oftaxpayerswith a higher real net return and would double the





mind that the 1980
72 level and therefore
the amount of finan—
e dividend—price ratio
had $200 of interestTable 8
CumulativeDistributions of Interest and Dividend Income
by Adjusted Gross Income Classes
Interest and Adjusted Gross Income Class
Dividend Income (Thousands of Dollars)
0—10 10—20 20—30 30+ All
$0 58 37 5
$200 77' 70 18
$liOO 82 80 59 26
$800 8y 81 13 )40 85
$1600 91 93 82 5)4 90
1ta:1912 TaxModelData
Numbers indicate cumulative percentages oftaxpayerswith less than the indi-
cated amountofinterestand dividend income._)4 3—
Since the vast majority of 1972 taxpayers had AGPs below $10,000, the
overall pattern also describes the distribution of interest and dividend income
in that income class. The pattern is also similar among those with A0Isbe-
tween $10,000 and $20,000. Only in the very small class of taxpayers with
higher incomes (less than 10 percent of 1972 taxpayers had flOPs over $20,000)
did the interest and dividend distribution differ substantially from this
pattern. For example, among those with AOl's between $20,000 and $30,000 of
income,only t45 percent had less than $200 of interest and dividend income. For
that income class, a $200 exclusion would be intramarginal for 55 percent of
taxpayers.
Table9 showsthat the distribution of interest and dividendincome
also differs substantially by age. While 71 percent of all taxpayers had less
than or equal to $200 of interest and dividends, more than 90 percent of those
less than 29 yearsold and 8opercent of those aged 30 to i9 fell into this
category. By contrast, only 32 percentofthose over age 6 had as little as
$200. These figures indicate that a $200 exclusion in 1972 would have had a
marginal incentive effect for a relatively large fraction of preretirerent tax-
payersand that, for those olderthan 65, the exclusion would he largely an
intramarginal reward for earlier saving.
3.2 Simulations of Alternative Exclusion Rules
Wenow present the results of simulations of alternative exclusion
rules. These simulations use the Taxsin nodel for 1972; the baseline simulation
therefore includes a $200 dividend exclusion. For cost reasons, we have
reducedthesample by a one—in—three random selection, yielding a simula-
tionsample of 8881 taxpayers._14 4
Table9
CumulativeDistributions of Interest and Dividend Income
by Age Class
Interest and Age Class
Dividend
Income
22—29 30_119 50_611 6i+ all
o 65 51 18
$ 200 91 8o 59 32 71
$1400 95 87 69 39 78
$8o0 97 93 78 50
$i600 98 914 89 63
ta:1972 TaxModel.
Numbers indicate cumulative percentage of taxpayers with less than the specifici
amount of interest and dividend income, 1iy agecategory.—45—
The effect of an exclusion rule on tax revenue depends only on the
parameters of the exclusion rule and not on the taxpayers' behavioral response.
This reflects the fact that no revenue is lost on the induced increase in saving
and the resulting increase in interest and dividend income.
Because the exclusion rules refer to the income earned on the stock of
financial assets and not to annual savings, we simulate the behavioral response
in terms of the stock of financial assets (or "assets for short).We estimate
each taxpayer's initial level of assets by assuming that the interest income
reflects an interest rate of 4.5 percent and that the dividend income reflects
a dividend—price ratio of 3.0 percent. On this basis we estimate an initial
average level of gross financial assets of $8,230for each of the 77.5 million
tax returns.
Table 10 presents the simulated effects on tax revenue and on assets
of the six exclusion plans:(1) exclusion of the first $200 of interest and
dividend income; (2) exclusion of the first $400; (3) exclusion of the first
$1000; (4) exclusion of half of the first $1000; (5) exclusion of interest
and dividend income in excess of a floor equal to 5 percent of income over
$10,000 subject to a limit of $1OOO; and (6) exclusion of 20 percent of interest
and dividend income without limit. These simulations are based on all tax-
payers, including those over age 65.The first row shows the effect of each
exclusion rule on the mean annual tax liability per taxpayer. Under the
existing law, the mean 1972 tax liability was $1,247. Exclusion of the first
$200 of interest as well as dividends would reduce this by $13 to $1234. This
very small change in tax revenue reflects the fact that most taxpayers have much






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reductionof $13 per return implies a total revenue loss of $1.0 billion.
Increasingthe exclusion from $200 to $1i00reducesmeantax revenue by
$8 perreturn, i.e., a doubling of the exclusion raises the revenue loss by
about 60percent.Similarly, raising the exclusion by 150 percent from $1400 tO
$1000only raises the revenue loss by about 75 percentor $16 per return.
Limitingthe exclusion to 50 percent of the first $1000 cuts the revenue loss in
half; i.e. ,thetotal revenue loss with this rule is $19 per return or about the
same as for a full exclusion ofthe first $1400of interest and dividends.
Limiting the exclusion to the excess over a floor of 5 percent of income over
$10,000 cuts the revenue loss from $37 to $30. Finally, the 20 percent
exclusion without limit reduces tax revenue by $314 per return.
Four types of behavioral responses are simulated. The first assumes
that each taxpayer increases his assets enough to take full advantage of the
exclusion. Thus for the $200 exclusion each taxpayer accumulates a total of
$1414145ofassets since we asume an interest rate of L.percent.Although the
averageinitial value of assets is $8,230 the distribution of these assets is
such that most taxpayers have substantially less than $14000; as Tahie8
indipated,Il percent of taxpayers had less than $200 of interest and dividendn.
The first number in the second row of Table 10 indicates that the average
increase in assets if each taxpayer accumulated enough to take advantage of the
full $200 exclusion would he $3,2814.
The second sinajiation reduces the fuil response in an arbitrary way
assuming that everyone moves half way from his existing assets to the full
$1414145.Thussomeone who currently has $3000 of assets increases them by $772.—8—
Thisresponse is of course equivalent to assuming that half ofthe taxpayers do
not respond at all while half respond fully, or to any other distribution of
individualresponses thataveracsahalf—wayresponse.
Thethird simulation makes the very conservative assumption that all
those taxpayers with no dividend and interest income in 197'2 would not respond
atall to the exclusion. Allother taxpayers increase theirassets to take full
advantage oftheexclusion. The result, shown in the third row of Table 10, is
an increase in rean assets of
The final simulation also begins with the conservative assumption that
those taxpayers who initially have no assets would continue to have no assets.
Moreover, those with a relatively small initial amount of assets are assumed to
show a correspondingly small, increase in wealth.In particular, we assume that
their behavior is governed by a constant elasticity response of assets to the





whereA0 isthe actual assets with the existing law, Al is the assets with the
exclusion, and B and 2 are the rates of transformation with the current and
alternative tax rules. With an exclusion hut no deduction, Pp =(l+i_)Tand,
asbefore, Pp =(1(l_0)j_1j)T;for any individual whose interest and dividend
income already exceeds the exclusion, R2Pç) and there is no change in assets.
We are fllly aware that this is a very rough model of behavior that does not
capture the life cycle character of the induced change in consumption and that
quite arbitrarily assumes that,all thosewho currently have no assetr are eithermyopic or would prefer to be net borrowers even if there were no tax on interest
income. We nevertheless illustrate this constant elasticity asset response by
simulating with two alternative values: n =1and n=2.31A unit elasticity
implies, for example, that an individual with a marginal tax rate of 20 percent
and initial assets of $2000 would increase his assets by $692; an elasticity of
2 would imply an increase of $1623. The result of these simulations are shown
in rows 5 and 6. With a $200 limit and a unit elasticity of response, the
average increae in assets would be $98; an elasticity of 2 inrplies a meanasset
increase of $191.
Although the results for the other exclusion limits in Table 10 are
self—explanatory, three comments are worth making. Note first that increasing
the exclusion limit raises the potential asset accumulation by more than a pro-
portionate amount.even though the revenue effect rises less than propor-
tionately. Second, the floor reduces the revenue cost of a $iooo limit exclu-
sion by $1 or somewhat less than 20 percent. In contrast, the increase in
assets in every behavioral simulation fell by a greater percentage. Third, the
20 percent exclusion has by far the largest behavioral effect both absolutelLy
and per dollar of revenue loss.
It is clear from the wide range of possible responses that we have
tabulated in Table 10 that our uncertainty about the effect of a dividend and
interest exclusion is very substantial. The 1980 legislation, introducing a
$ 4OO interest and dividend exclusion, will provide a natural experiment from
which we can hope to learn more about the nature of the individual savings—50—
response. Of course, the evidence on even the first year's experience
be available in usable form until about l984 and the political process
to make decisions about savings incentives before then. It is perhaps
reassuring therefore that the simulations reported in Table 10 indicat
alternative exclusion plans involve quite little revenue loss. Moreov
these revenue loss figures overstate the net impact of an interest and
exclusion to the extent that the additional capital is invested in the
sectorand results in increased corporate tax revenue.
Conclusion
The public's increased awareness of the low rate of personal saving in
the United States and of the high effective tax rate ontheincome from per—
floor) or severely restrict the size of the incentive effect (for those who are
near the ceiling). The desirability of any saving plan depends critically on
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are two principal options:
sited in special accounts
are withdrawn and (2) the
income. The revenue loss
can be limited by restrict
sion or by allowing only a
any such ceiling or floor,
(forthose with savings or
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ing. Although there are many specific plans, there
(i) deductions from taxableincomefor savings depo—
whereinterest then accrues untaxed untilthe funds
exclusionof interest and dividends from taxable
that would result from such deductions or exclusions
ions on the maximum amount ofthededuction or exclu—
partialdeduction as exclusion. The problem with
however,is that it mayeliminatemarginal incentives
investmentincome above the ceiling or welL belowthe—51—
Analyzingthe effects of limits and floors requires microeconomic data
onsaving, financial assets, and interest and dividend income. The present
paper uses such data from individual tax returns and fromthe Consumer
Expenditure Survey to estimate the potential effects of alternative tax rules.
Because the likely response of households to new tax rules is not known, we pre-
sent simulations for a variety of different behavioral assumptions.
Although the savings deduction and the interest exclusion are fun-
damentally very similar, they are likely to have quite different effects during
a rather long period of transition because they treat active savers very dif-
ferently from those who previously saved and are currently dissaving. Moreover,
potential savers maybeinfluenced by the liquidity differences between the two
methods or by the appearance that the immediate deduction confers a greater
benefit. Because individuals differ in their situations and perceptions, a
combination of both plans might be more effective in raising saving than an
equal—cost reliance on either plan alone. The paper therefore presents separate
analysis for both types of plans.
The evidence that we present is not adequate for choosing the best
combination of these options or eyen for deciding whether either option should
be chosen. We do not have sufficient information about savings behavior to pre-
dict the response of capital accumulation to these plans. Moreover, the design
of an appropriate tax policy involves not only the savings response but more
general aspects of excess burden and the fair distribution of the tax burden.
But the analyses in this paper are sufficient to demonstrate that some
of the potential problems that have been raised as objections to the savings
proposals are not very serious. First, although some of any savings deduction—52—
would merely reward saving that would have occurred in any case, even with a
deduction limited to 10 percent of wages and salaries (with a ceiling of $2000)
there would be very few savers for whom the incentive was intramarginal.
Similarly, at 1972 levels of wealth and interest rates, a $1400 exclusion of
interest and dividends would provide a marginal incentive for more than 75 per-
cent of taxpayers.
The second basic fact that emerges in our study is that the reduction in
tax revenue caued by an exclusion or deduction plan would he relatively nodest.
With the exclusion plans, the revenue loss does not depend on the taxpayers'
response to the changed incentive. In 1972, a $1400 interest and dividend exclu-
sion would have entailed a revenue loss of only $21 per taxpayer or an
aggregate of less than $2 billion. Increases in the $to0linitinvolve substan-
tially less than proportionate increases in the revenue loss. The revenue
effect of a savings deduction plan does depend on the reaction of savers to the
new incentive. Although some preexisting assets would be transferred into the
special accounts in the years immediately after a savings deduction plan was
introduced, the potential transfer amounts and associated revenue loss are rela-
tively small for the vast majority of taxpayers. After the transition period,
if there were no increase in saving, a deduction limited to 10 percent of wage
income (with a ceiling of $2000) would entail a revenue loss at 1972 levels of'
only $14 billion.33 Any actual increase in saving that is induced by the deduc-
tion would then substantially exceed the associated loss of tax revenue.14—53—
—Footnotes—
*MartinFeiLdsteinis Professor of Economics, Harvard University and President
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Daniel Feenberg is a Postdoctoral
Research Economist at the NBER. This paper was presented at the NBER
Conference on Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis on January
26—21, 1981. The views expressed here are the authors' and should not be attri—
buted to anyorganisation.
1 Total capital formation depends also on government saving and international
capital flows. Government saving has always been small and, in the majorityof
years since 1950, has been negative. Feldstein andHorioka (1980) show that
U.S. net international capital flows have averaged less than one percent of
savingand, for the OECD as a whole, are not responsive to domestic differences
in saving rates.
2 Some would say to "reduce the features that discourage saving." The dif-
ference depends on whether one takes "income" or "expenditure" as the
appropriate object of taxation. Weneednot comment on this issue in the
current paper.
See, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981), Becker and Fullerton (1980),
Boskin (1918), Bradford (1980), Feldstein (1917,1918a), Fullertonet. al.
(1979), King (1980), McLure (1980), Summers (1918) and VonFurstenhurg(1980).
This sentence and the following twosentencesare explained in Feldstein
(l9'T8b)._514_
5 The proposed changes in the tax treatment of saving are compensated changes
if not reducing the tax on saving would imply that some other tax would be
reduced.
6 We use the expressions "tax on saving" and "tax on the income from saving"
interchangeably.
7 The inflationary pressure could of course be checked by a tighter monetary
policy, allowing the money rate of interest to rise relative to the Wicksellian
natural rate of interest during the transition. But such exclusive reliance on
monetary policy in the transition is not without substantial real costs in our
economy with many long—term fixed interest contracts.
These ideas about the timing of tax changes are discussed briefly in
Feldstein (1980) and developed more fully in Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1981).
9 The economists who have participated in the development of TAXSIM are Daniel
Feenberg, Martin Feldstein, Daniel F'risch, Larry Lindsey, and Harvey Rosen.
10 The Consumer Expenditure Survey contains fewer observations on high incone
families, is aggregated into family units rather than taxpayer units and does
not contain a precise measure of taxable income.
11 These two methods can be equivalent in the sense that they define the same
lifetime budget constraint for an individual and therefore induce the same
consumption choices. This equivalence is violated to the extent that these are
bequests or that the individual's marginal tax rate varies over time. Moreover,
in practice these proposals would differ for a very long transition period—55—
because different cohorts of taxpayers are affected differently, e.g. ,thebene—
fits of deducting saving have little effect on those who are already retired
while an interest and dividend exclusion does; more generafly, on the noneqihva—
lence in the transition generation of consumption taxes (that a].low a savings
deduction) and labor income taxes (that exclude capital income) see Feldtein
(19'18b).
12 This proposal has a long and venerable pedigree that is discussed in Kaldor
(1955) and Musgrave (1959). See also Bradford (1980), Feldstein (1976), Fisher
(1937), Kay and King (1978), The Meade Commission (1918) and the U.S. Treasury
(1977).
13 Individuals with self—employment income are eligible for a similar program.
Anyone can contribute up to 15 percent of self—employment income to a Keogh
Plan, with a maximum of $7500. The contribution is deductible and the income
of the plan is untaxed. Withdrawals are taxed as ordinary employment income.
A "participant" in such a pension plan need not have or he accruing any
vested benefits.
15 On the extent of private pension coverage, see President's Commission of
Private Pensions (1980).
16 The number of IRA plans indicates that only about 5 percent of those who are
eligible have actually established an IRA; see Lubick (1980) p.l4.
11 The Canadian government introduced such a plan in 1972.—56—
18As opposed to judging it in terms of removing the tax wedgebetween the pre—
tax and post—tax rates of returns or of switching the taxbase to avoid what
some regard as an unjust double taxation ofincome that is saved.
19 This would, of course, be offset by a reduction in other consumer spending
caused by the increase (or lack of decrease) in some other tax.
20 Individuals might in priciple borrow and use the borrowed funds to finance
their IRA contributions, thus earning tax free interest in the IRA and paying
tax deductible interest on the borrowed funds. We ignore the possihilltyof
borrowing on the assumption that most individuals have little opportunityto
borrow without collateral and that the expanded IRA (like the existingIRA and
Keogh) could not legally be accepted as collateral for a loan. Individuals
might borrow 'byenlargingtheir house mortgage but this would be discouraged by
the need to hold most of the proceeds of such borrowing for several yearsbefore
it could be contributed to the IRA.
21 If the change in the saving rule is a compensated change, the income effect
could be ignored. Of course, the alternative tax change might also affect
current work and thus current saving.
22 In some calculations, however, we assume that taxpayers over the age of 65
are not eligible to participate.
23 The 1972 mean dividend price ratio for the Standard and Poors corporate
index of 500 stocks was percent. The maximum interest rate that could be
paid on time deposits was 4.5 percent.—57—
24Unless the individual borrows to finance these contributions. See footnote
20 for the reasons whythisis not likely to be a significant problem.
25 Individuals might, of course, seek to circumvent the floor by bunching their
saving into alternate years but this would be worth doing only if the ceiling
is not binding.
26 In reality, there would not be single year but a probabilistic interval
with probabiliti.es that reflect survival probabilities.
21 If only a fraction A of the contribution is deductible but the subsequent
tax is limited to the same fraction of withdrawals, the rate of tranformation
becomes B1 =(1—Xe')(l+iTr)t/(l_XO); with a binding level of deductibility, the
plan has no effect on marginal saving and therefore R1R0.
28 Recall that for the representative taxpayer the real net rate of return rises
from —0.005 to 0.020; including the deductibility effect implies that the
current opportunity cost of consumption rises from 0.93 to 1.57.
29 This measure of revenue loss does not reflect the extra corporate tax reve-
nue that would be collected on the additional capital.
30 Different combinations of the "exclusion limit" and the "exclusion
fraction" correspond to the same loss of tax revenue buthavedifferent
incentive effects. The incentive effect depends on the distribution of existing
wealth and on the sensitivity of saving to the net return.It would be
interesting to use the information on the distribution of assets and alternative
assumptions about the savings response to examine the implication of alternative
combinations of the limit and the exclusion fraction.—58—
.: 31 At first, this seems to be insharp contrast to the savings deduction plan
where a deduction is given for induced saving as well as for the saving that
would have occurred in any case. But the deduction itself is relevant only to
the extent that the marginal tax rate of the saver exceeds his marginal
tax rate when funds are withdrawn. Even when this is true, it is not a reason
for preferring one plan over the other without knowing more about theresponse
of individuals to this aspect since schemes with equal reveue loss could
obviouslr be designed.
32
In 1972, all interest income was taxable. Although a $200 exclusion applied
to dividend income, most taxpayers did not have any dividend income.
33 This short n revenue loss is basedon the existing saving distribution and
excludes asset transfers; see section 2.1 for evidence on the modest one—time
revenue cost of allowing deductions for asset transfers. The corresponding long
run revenue loss, which reflects also both the loss of the subsequent tax reve-
nues that would have been collected on the interest and dividends on these
savings and the gain in tax revenue that would eventually he collected when the
funds are withdrawn, would be about $5 billion.
35 Recall that if the revenue losson this additional saving is measured by the
immediate consequence of the deduction, an extra dollar of saving reduces tax
revenue by only about 20 cents. This tax reduction is partially recovered (in
a present value sense) to the extent that the individual's tax rate is as high
when the funds are withdrawn. Although no tax is collected on the interestand
dividends earned on the extra capital, this is not a revenue loss since itwould
not otherwise have existed. Indeed, the corporate income tax on this add—
tionalcapital could more than offset the loss in personal tax revenue.—59—
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